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# SHUTTLE CRITICAL ITEMS LIST - ORBITER

SUBSYSTEM : LANDING/DECELERATION-LGC FMEA NO 02-1A -018 -1 REV:09/19/88

ASSEMBLY : MAIN LANDING GEAR (MLG)

P/N RI :MC621-0011

CRIT. FUNC: CRIT. HDW: VEHICLE 102 103 104

P/N VENDOR:1170303 MENASCO VEHICLE 102 103 104
QUANTITY:2 EFFECTIVITY: X X X

ONE LEFT MAIN GEAR PHASE(S): PL LO OO DO LS X

:ONE RIGHT MAIN GEAR

PREPARED BY:

REDUNDANCY SCREEN: A- B- CPREPARED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY:

APPROVED BY:

DES R. A. GORDON DES RALONO 7/21/88
REL J. S. MULLEN REL

PROVED BY:

APPROVED BY: KNASA) &

SSM BLUE GOTTER

RELEQUOR FLETTING

QE W. J. SMITH QE MST 14 57

ITEM:

MAIN LANDING GEAR SUPPORT BEAM

FUNCTION:

PROVIDES SUPPORT BETWEEN UPPER DRAG BRACES ON MLG.

FAILURE MODE:

STRUCTURAL FAILURE

CAUSE(S):

OVERLOAD, DEFECTIVE PART/MATERIAL.

EFFECT(S) ON:

- (A) SUBSYSTEM (B) INTERFACES (C) MISSION (D) CREW/VEHICLE
- (A) LOSS OF LOAD CARRYING CAPABILITY.
- (B) DAMAGE TO VEHICLE STRUCTURE.
- (C,D) PROBABLE LOSS OF MISSION/CREW/VEHICLE DUE TO GEAR COLLAPSE.

# DISPOSITION & RATIONALE:

(A) DESIGN (B) TEST (C) INSPECTION (D) FAILURE HISTORY (E) OPERATIONAL USE

### (A) DESIGN

DESIGNED TO FATIGUE LOAD SPECTRUM FOR LANDING, TAXI, AND GROUND HANDLING CONDITIONS. DESIGNED TO LANDING IMPACT LOADS (SPIN- UP AND SPRING BACK INCLUDING CROSSWIND DRIFT CONDITIONS) USING A MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY (1.0 TO YIELD STRENGTH OF MATERIAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH ESTABLISHED CRITER: FOR COMMERCIAL AND MILITARY AIRCRAFT. DESIGNED TO A MINIMUM FACTOR OF SAFETY OF 1.4 FOR TAXI AND GROUND HANDLING LOADS MATERIAL PROCESSES - BARE PARTS ARE NOT EXPOSED TO CORROSIVE ACID ENVIRONMENT IN PLATING SHOWN MORE THAN 30 DAYS AND PARTS ARE SHOT PEENED AFTER MACHINE OPERATIONS TO PREVENT STRESS CORROSION ON 300 M MATERIALS.

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#### (B) TEST

QUALIFICATION TESTS: CERTIFICATION INCLUDES ULTIMATE STRENGTH TEST, SHOCK STRUT DROP TESTS, STATIC LOADS TEST, DYNAMIC TESTS AND 400 DEPLOYMENT CYCLES.

THE SUPPORT BEAM ASSEMBLY WAS CERTIFIED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MLG MECHANISM INSTALLATION (LANDING GEAR OPERATION) - 32 CYCLES OF THE LANDING GEAR DURING ALT, 15 DEVELOPMENT CYCLES AND 353 QUALIFICATION LICYCLES FOR A TOTAL OF 400 CYCLES. (THE LANDING GEAR WAS CYCLED FROM UITAND LOCKED TO DOWN AND LOCKED EACH TIME).

HIGH TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT 140 DEG F

COLD TEMP TESTS; 3 CYCLES AT =35 DEG F TO -40 DEG F

THE SUPPORT BEAM WAS ALSO TESTED AS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE MLG SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY DURING DROP TESTS - ELEVEN DROP TESTS WERE PERFORMED TO SATISFY THE DESIGN REQUIREMENTS FOR THE SHOCK STRUT ASSEMBLY.
MAXIMUM VERTICAL LOAD WAS 179,817 LBS.
MAXIMUM SINK SPEED WAS 11.69 FPS.

FATIGUE LOAD SPECTRUM TESTS WERE CONDUCTED FOR LANDING, LANDING ROLLOUT BRAKING AND TURNING LOAD CONDITIONS - THE STRUT WAS SUBJECTED TO CYCLIC APPLICATION OF VERTICAL, FORE/AFT AND SIDE LOADS IN EACH CONDITION.

ACCEPTANCE TESTS: ACCEPTANCE INCLUDES VERIFICATION THAT CERTIFIED MATERIALS AND PROCESSES WERE USED. ACCEPTANCE TESTS ALSO VERIFY DIMENSIONS, WEIGHTS AND FINISHES.

OMRSD: MLG ZONAL DETAIL VISUAL INSPECTION; THE SUPPORT BEAM AND IT'S ATTACHMENTS ARE INSPECTED FOR CONDITION AND SECURITY.

FREQUENCY - ALL VEHICLES AT GROUND TURNAROUND.

#### (C) INSPECTION

#### RECEIVING INSPECTION

INSPECTION VERIFIES ALL RAW MATERIALS TO COMPLY WITH MATERIAL REQUIREMENTS THROUGH PERIODIC COUPON ANALYSIS.

# CONTAMINATION CONTROL

ALL CLEANLINESS LEVELS VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

# ASSEMBLY/INSTALLATION

ALL MATERIAL PROCESSES VERIFIED BY MIP'S PRIOR TO NEXT MANUFACTURING OPERATIONS.

# CRITICAL PROCESSES

HEAT TREAT, CD-TI PLATING, AND SHOT PEENING ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

# NONDESTRUCTIVE EVALUATION

MATERIAL SURFACE DEFECTS ARE VERIFIED BY FLUORESCENT PENETRANT INSPECTION.

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**TESTING** 

TORSIONAL OVERLOADS ARE VERIFIED BY DYNAMIC AND STATIC TESTS PERFORMED DURING QUALIFICATION TESTING.

PACKAGING/HANDLING HANDLING AND PACKAGING REQUIREMENTS ARE VERIFIED BY INSPECTION.

- (D) FAILURE HISTORY NONE.
- (E) OPERATIONAL USE NONE.